

**Welfare State in Uncertainty: between dissatisfied social expectations and strong attitudes**

**Olga Kutsenko**

Faculty of Sociology  
Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv  
olga.kutsenko.ua28@gmail.com

**Andrii Gorbachyk**

Faculty of Sociology  
Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv  
a.gorbachyk@gmail.com

**Abstract**

It is presented the findings of empirical comparative analysis of social attitudes to social responsibility of governance in six western and eastern European countries. The analysis is based on ESS-4 (2007) data base. The three-dimensional model of social attitudes allows to recognize three basic western welfare regimes and a forming welfare order under post-socialism. With using of the linear regression it is justified influence of institutional, cultural and structural factors on social attitudes of citizens in respect to social responsibility of governance. The thesis about social cleavages, which probably have to determine the social attitudes, is not justified in this study. It is verified that the social attitudes and expectations of citizens depend essentially on individual experience of interaction between an individual and public institutes as well as a social system as whole. The institutional and cultural (ideological) factors appear as most influence in determination of attitudes towards welfare state. The empirical analysis fixes a very unsteady current process of welfare development and of searching for fitter forms of social contracts in different types of European societies. The post-socialist states form a special 'worlds' of welfare in European space, in which the post-Soviet states are a quite distinct family.

**Key words:** social responsibility, welfare state, social attitude and expectations

**Introduction**

The threshold of the 20-21<sup>st</sup> centuries is marked not only in calendars. In the current period of time societies have faced with previously unknown issues connected with globalization, changes in technological modes of life, shifts in mass value consciousness, crises in capitalism as well as in the former state socialism. These processes spark multiple societal transformations, expansion of the new (or renewed) forms of inequalities as well as personal vulnerability in a society; it resulted in the growth of mass discontent with the state and its social regulation policy, as well as in the crises both in the welfare in the most of countries and the debate on the dominating issues of welfare policy (Pierson 2001). How active will the state have to be in regulation of the wellbeing both of individuals as well as a society per se? What ways are more efficient in balancing of the public goods, productive capacities, sustainable development of a society and satisfaction of the public needs, personal needs of citizens in protection against worsening of quality of life, especially under the social instability and economic crises?

The current debates on these issues have not resulted till now in well-founded answers which take into account as the different historical experience of the welfare state solutions as the multiple current challenges to the state social policy.

The expansion of the most western welfare regimes started just after the WWII and lasted until the late 1970s. They were developed historically on the bases of variations of social insurance and social assistance systems and were established in three main dimensions: (1) a system of various forms of publicly supported social insurance to deal with a range of risks people experience in their life; (2) a tax regime sufficient to provide funding by the state for a fairly expansive set of

public goods; (3) a regulatory regime for the economy that restricts the negative externalities of the markets. The development of the western welfare regimes after the WWII became a some kind of a response on the state socialism with its mass protection social policy and, at least in part, the effect of a *positive class compromise* (termed by E.O.Wright, 2012) between the capitalist class and the popular social forces. The welfare state became 'at the heart of the institutional structure of all European societies' and wider (Bable 2011: 571).

But in the 1990s, after the breakdown of the state socialism in Eastern Europe and the spread of neoliberalism in the world with its ideas of market regulation of social wellbeing, the interconnected concepts of 'welfare state', 'social state' as well as a 'good society' were ejected out of the intellectual, scientific and public debate mainstream. This 'ejection' of the issues and the corresponding concepts was happened on a background of the deep crisis in the welfare state' practices (Svallfors 2003; Esping-Andersen 2006), viz.:

- the "warping" of market as a result of the cost-based welfare state, which has been strangling a market by the high taxation necessary for the ensuring of the social programs, as well as decreasing of a labor motivation, and stimulus to capital accumulation and investment;
- long-term effects on the welfare state sparked by the aging of population; these effects are connected with increase of a financial load on a working person and social infrastructure in whole;
- the undermine of the traditional models of social solidarity; changes in the family values;
- the challenges of the new global economy on ineffective governance and noncompetitive economics;
- the technological displacement of the middle class under the current economic crisis.

However, no longer than at the end of the first decade of the 2000s under the new global economic crisis a pendulum of public and academic attention started to shift towards the opposite side, viz. to strength of a role of a state in regulation of numerous social issues. In 2009, at the suggestion of the president of Kirgizstan, the United Nations General Assembly declared the annual World day for social justice. In the special resolution of the UN it was defined the necessity of the overcoming of poverty, the guaranteeing of full employment, worth labor, welfare and social justice for all people, and the equal rights for male and female. One of the most influence sociologists of the time – Randal Collins (2010: 30) - in his plenary paper at the conference in 2009, devoted to the centenary of the *Sociological Review* journal, justifies an idea about coming back in the current social policy the Keynesian solution of a welfare state, which is capable, on Collin's mind, to provide an escape from the deadlock of the current crisis of capitalist states.

The financial and economic crisis since the 2008<sup>th</sup> has caused a destructive effect on the middle classes (through inflation and closure of the credit programs, slump in financing of education and science etc.) as well as on the different offence groups (through inflation, grow of unemployment and the cutting of social programs), stimulated the expansion of mass protests in the world.

As a result, the renewed old and new elaborations of the welfare state theories come again into the focus of public and academic interest and discussions. What kinds of welfare state solutions can be more successful in the crisis and rapidly changing world? What ways and scales of state intrusion into regulation of social issues can be more effective?

The special cases of academic and policy interest are formed by a set of post-socialist European countries. During the state-socialism regimes there were created the well-developed patronage systems of wide social security, however there were related strongly on employment, sometimes even more than in the typical social insurance countries of Western Europe (Therborn 1995). The appropriate institutional system was embedded into the state socialism and everyday social life. The patronage approach in welfare usually divides citizens' interests along clientelistic lines. According to Therborn (1995: 89-97) this kind of the social welfare regime led to an occupationally fragmented system of particular social rights unlike the other variations of the regimes based mostly on social assistance, usually tended to a general system of universal social rights and became more developed in different variations in Western Europe. Under the state socialism the state enterprises, as a rule, became the centre of welfare provision, especially social

and medical services. Though, for several decades of life under the state socialism the corresponding societies used to enjoy the guaranties of the full employment, social insurance (based on employment or more narrowly on occupation), subsidized prices on public goods and service, the developed system of social infrastructure and assistance at the state enterprises. People got accustomed to rely on a state insuring them against the multiple risks people experience in their lives. However after the collapse of the state socialism, under the rapid institutional changes, market transition and disruption of the state-guarantied system of employment and corresponding social insurance (based on employment), the previous welfare socialist regime was also destroyed. People faced high risks of uncertainty and insecurity, and experienced the traumatic social syndrome (termed by P.Sztompka). However, under conditions of economic crisis of the 1990s, long-term stagnation of state enterprises, undeveloped market regimes, at least under discontinuity of employment and occupational carrier and social status of many people as a result of deep social structural changes, the most post-socialism countries, according to T.Inglor (2008), not followed the path to universalism in the social rights (like Scandinavian solution), but towards renovation in some parts the occupational insurance system taking the European Continental welfare regimes as a pattern. Till now in the most post-socialist countries like Ukraine, Russian Federation etc. the formation of a fitting welfare regime is not completed. Furthermore, it is not clear the ways of development of a regime. The embedding or adaptability of any regime depends essentially on the mass attitudes towards it as well as mass willingness to support a regime. On the bases of analyses the empirical data about the mass and social classes-grounded attitudes to welfare regimes (the data collected in different European countries within the European Social Survey research project (ESS-round 4), we are going to reflect the challenges mentioned above and to make contribution into identification a link between social classes and welfare regime legitimating in different types of European societies.

### **Research design**

It can be recognized two main approaches to welfare state development, which we identify as “strong” and “weak” programs. Within the “weak program” the justification of selection of welfare solution is grounded on some kind of normative orientation, or the best empirical pattern which function successfully in a certain state. As a rule, such orientations reflect subjectively and ideologically based images about the more proper social order. Implementation of this normative model into a society as well as in a real policy, and its further development depends principally on legitimating of a model by mass consciousness; it fits for social and cultural expectations of a society. So far as social processes are directed by culture and social structure, by social actions, actor’s strategies as well as *causa libera* in social interactions, they shape by time and space, so the forced adaptation of any normative model of a policy to a society can lead to unexpected results: policy-supported but ‘nonrooted’ in a society patterns provoke their rejection by social system, stimulate social dissatisfaction and protests. These processes spark a ‘curvature’ of social reality and development of the ‘modified forms’ (in term by K.Marx). Social parasitism, alienation, and decline of trust to social and political institutes become a probable aftermath of implementation of the ‘weak program’.

In contrast to the logic of the ‘weak program’ and close to it populist declarations about normative-oriented welfare reforms, the ‘strong program’ of welfare solution is based on empirical evaluation of capability of a society, its culture and social structure to legitimate and adopt a certain welfare model that can resulted in a successful regulative policy coping with various social issues.

On this assumption we intend to make the empirically-based estimation of social expectations concerning welfare state in western (with well-developed markets and welfare traditions) and eastern (post-socialist) European societies. This intention will be framed in the following research tasks:

- 1) on the ground of the current theoretical elaborations in this concern it will be specified the basic empirical institutional patterns of welfare in European societies and will define the basic features of these patterns and corresponding theoretically estimated social expectations concerning welfare regime;

- 2) as far as it is no knowledge about the normative levels of social estimation of a welfare pattern which provide its legitimating and successful implementation, so we need to use a comparative method for analyses. Application of the comparative method will allow us to define differences in social estimations which can reflect the differences between the empirical welfare regimes and their successfulness. For application of the comparison it will be defined the empirical referents of the welfare states patterns in Europe. If we find out on empirical analysis the theoretically estimated patterns of social expectations concerning a welfare regime, so it will be the weighty argument in favor of the selected variables which should describe the basic features of the welfare patterns. The international comparison of the variables will allow us to come to conclusions about trends of the certain societies towards the certain welfare solution;
- 3) the social estimations of a welfare regime should be differ not only in international comparison (when an analytical unit is a nation-state-society). Social expectations and estimations should depend principally on class structure, structural cleavages, and class-related policy in societies. Class cleavages as well as class fragmentations can reflect in contradictive expectations concerning a welfare regime. For measurement of impact of class belonging on estimations of welfare regime, we will compare correlations of class and other social structure indicators with attitudes to welfare regime. In current capitalism a shift towards service sector in economy is happened. How is successful the welfare policy, embedded into the variations of capitalism, in regulation of social issues arisen on the new class cleavages?

### ***Who is responsible for individual wellbeing in a society? Theoretical interpretations***

The concept of welfare state corresponds closely to a wider concept of social responsibility which has very sociological sense and recently has been adapted from the new economics of business (McBarnet & Campbell 2007) to contemporary theories of civil society and 'social state'. The interpretation of a welfare state through bringing a sense of social responsibility into the conceptual frame will allow to depart strictly instrumental features of the concept (usually is termed as combination of social insurance, market regulation policy and tax regime) and to outline the principal dimension of a welfare state, its historical root as well as its embedment into a triangle of interrelations between family, state and society. It is natural that activities of a state, public policy strongly affect a society, life quality of communities and a family, health state of individuals as well as their social involvement. However, in respect to interconnections of a state with family or individuals and in the terms of responsibility for a family's welfare, a state can form different kinds of relationships: from a laissez-faire position of non-interference into family's life conditions ('an individual or a family is responsible for own life') to a position of an active interference, control and regulation of individual/family welfare ('a state is responsible for individual wellbeing'). In this set of variations in interpretative positions, the social responsibility of a state appears as a kind of relationship between a state and families or individuals, which corresponds with an obligation of a state to act to benefit society at large and individual wellbeing as well as with interests of a state in assistance and solution of different social issues, concerns for life quality and social inclusion of individuals, concerns for social solidarity in a society.

Some recent studies of social development and responsibility of a state contribute in different ways in theoretical interpretation a welfare conception. The basic contemporary benefits to enrichment of the conception are specified by:

- the 'good society' approach in neo-Kantian tradition, established in the 1960s-70s by Rawls and Habermas and which was developed later in the "binary discourse" in terms of universalism or communitarianism vs. particularism as a modes of the good society development and achievement of social wellbeing. The sociological communitarian version of the good society, developed by A.Etzioni (1996), and the 'moral civil society' vision by J.Alexander (2000; 2006) make a focus on a moral quality of a community (in interpretation by Etzioni) or a citizenship (by J. Alexander), on the morality and solidarity in explanations of the main sources of an individual wellbeing

and a civil society efficacy. On the bases of study of the long-term survived and more or less effective enclave economies developed by ethnic migrants, A.Portes (1987) involves the concepts of the 'bonded solidarities' and the 'civil engagement' in interpretation of successfulness of the corresponding community. The value of a web of crisscrossing affective social bonds, and the moral quality of values and mores in interpretation of a community and citizenship as responsible for an individual wellbeing are the basic components in the triangle of relationships between an individual, state, and society;

- an institutional and political-economy approach, recently by the 'New Constitutionnalists' such as W.Anderson, St.L.Elkin, Ph.Green etc. (Soltan & Elkin 1996; Elkin & Soltan 1999 etc.), and by G.Esping-Andersen (2002), which underlines the significance of the 'citizen competences' (in interpretation by the 'Constitutionnalists') and a role of the 'good' norm-oriented institutional design in development of an efficient democratic citizenship as well as welfare state;
- the 'community driven development' and 'social accountability' approach, widely recognized via the World Bank reports since 2004, underlines an idea about significance of citizen involvement (the critical point for enhancing democratic governance) in improving service delivery; the ability of citizens, civil society organizations and other non-state actors to hold the state accountable (Ellison 1997; Carnwall and Gaventa 2000; 2001) and make it responsive to their needs. The "Demands for Good Governance" (The World Bank Report 2013) aims at strengthen the capacity of the NGOs, local communities and the private sector to hold the state (authorities) accountable for better wellbeing results. The interpretation of welfare state on this theoretical basis is focused on the demand-driven mechanisms which are operated from the bottom-up and create a social accountability of the state (authority and decision-making). Social accountability can play an important role in development of collaboration between the state (government) and civil society and aid public institutions in meeting the expectations of the society;
- the '*assets and capability approach*' developed by A. Sen (1999; 2009) emphasizes a notion of universal human right in evaluating various states with regard to justice; it recognizes that formal and informal institutions can facilitate or constraint efforts to secure people against poverty and social exclusion. Based on a person-centered institutional interpretation, Sen not only emphasizes the importance of assets but draws attention to their returns, or how those assets translate into improved wellbeing for poor people. To ensure those returns, institutions must allow assets to be used productively and freely, promoting, in a term by Sen, capabilities.


The current development of re-interpretation of social responsibility and a fitter welfare solution are oriented on the prospective ideas framed by the approaches mentioned above.

The historically based responses on the challenges of responsibility for an individual or family' wellbeing formed on the three pillars between which the responsibility is shared: state (governance), communities (civil society), and an individual (family) with his (its) market competitiveness. Subject to the accent on one of the 'pillars', the empirical models of responsibility for welfare and the corresponding welfare regimes were developed between the extremes of (1) the laissez-faire approach resulted in the rudimental models of a welfare state with the undeveloped legal rights of citizens on social security and public assistance, and \ or with engagement of the civil society domination with market refrains and (2) the totalitarian model of public control for a certain standards of wellbeing firmed and secured by a state without influence of market, like the model of the state socialism in the former USSR. According to G.Esping-Andersen (1990; 1996), Svallfors (2003) etc., the stress on the 'systemness of institutional arrangements within a state leads to differ three basic models of market economy, partially mirroring welfare regimes, which appearance between the extremes: (i) the 'liberal' welfare model, (ii) the Scandinavian welfare model, and (iii) the continental European welfare model. All these models are embedded into capitalism (with liberalism or social democracy), but not all of them had an equalizing effect because social insurance has often focused on income security rather than equality. Now all these models are under

challenges of crisis of capitalism as well as under impact of the emergencies of the welfare state per se (Kaufmann 2010), and in search for new fitter models of social contracts - a new family, youth and elder people' policy, social inclusion and cohesion through employment and the generational contract etc. The former socialist welfare states, under impact of liberal democratization and free market capitalism, and after dismantle of their previously strong social patronage institutions, have partly kept or revive their old insurance traditions as well as partly have installed new forms of social protections. After the breakdown of the state socialism system, the post-Soviet countries did not follow the Scandinavian road to universalism but rather the Continental way of occupational social insurance. At the end of the 2010<sup>th</sup>, the welfare policy in the post-soviet countries is classified as been even more employment-related than in Western Europe (Inglor 2008; Bable 2010: 576). As a result, according to Th.Bable, J.Kohl, and Cl.Wendt, the new 'layered' complex welfare systems in Eastern European countries do not easy fit into the typologies developed on the basis of 'varieties across Western Europe' (2010: 580). However, till now quantitative analyses of advanced welfare states rarely include the Eastern European, especially post-Soviet, countries due to their still unsettled situation as transition states (Abrahamson 2010; for an exception see: Castels and Obinger 2008) as well as absence the good national statistical data.

Though the scale challenges to welfare state, the majority of comparative, as institutional, as sociologically oriented studies which pointed to various degrees of change such as the recalibrating, recasting, renewing or reforming of welfare states, but concluding that these changes have led to a survival of the welfare state (Clegg, 2007; Drahoukoupil, 2007; Castels and Obinger, 2008). The outcomes of two-decades studies of the welfare systems by different researchers allow us to assert that the 'regime-typology' approach in comparative analysis remains useful in conceptualization of distinct features of different welfare states as well as in classification of empirical similarities between them, grounded on cultural traditions. However, the conceptualizations of empirical variations of welfare regimes need the further development which will include the post-socialist East European cases. The results of one of such recent development given by Ebbinghaus (2012) is presented in Fig.1.

Fig.1 - The conceptual map of Esping Andersen's Regimes (1990, 1999) developed by Ebbinghaus (2012: 14)



The challenging question arises on a basis of the brief consideration, given above: how much these theoretical and empirically based models within the institutional approach correlate with mass expectations of citizens in the corresponding countries in respect with a subject of responsibility for individual welfare?

## Data base and research hypotheses

Our research is based on the 4<sup>th</sup> wave of the European Social Survey data<sup>1</sup>, collected in 2008-2009 in 31 European countries. This wave contains a special module in a questionnaire developed by St. Svallfors (2005), W. van Oorschot, P. Taylor-Gooby, C. Staerkle, and J.Goul Andersen and devoted to measure attitudes towards welfare state in Europe which changes.

For comparative cross-national analysis and on the basis of the advanced Esping-Andersen's welfare regime typology (Ebbinghaus 2012: 14), we selected three countries-referents which represent more strongly the main welfare capitalism regimes: The Great Britain with the liberal (more market and individualistic) model; Sweden with social-democratic ('solidarian') model; and Germany with the continental ('Christian-Democratic', more subsidiary) model of welfare. Poland, Russian Federation and Ukraine are also included into comparison as the post-Socialist Eastern European societies with the emergence, developing states and renewed welfare systems.

The selected countries divide noticeably on indicators of quality of life (see Table 1) as well as the social expenditure in the national budgets (see Table 2). The state of life quality defines the risks for individual wellbeing and, thus, can firm the preconditions for social expectations of citizens concerning welfare, social protection, and needed the state's social assistance.

**Table 1. - Selected indicators of quality of life as precondition for social expectations of citizens in 6 European countries**

	Life expectation, in years, 2007 *	Rating on life expectation, 2007 *	Human Development Index, 2007 *	Rating HDI *	Income per capita, 2009 in USD **	Unemployment, % of total labor force, 2010-2012 **
Ukraine	68.5	110	0.796	85	2800	8.8
Russian Federation	66.2	116	0.817	71	9370	7.5
Poland	75.5	46	0.880	41	1260	9.6
Sweden	80.8	8	0.963	7	48930	8.4
Germany	79.8	17	0.947	22	42560	7.1
The Great Britain	79.3	24	0.947	21	41520	7.8

Sources:

\* UNDP. Human Development Report 2009: Overcoming Barriers: Human Mobility and Development. N.Y.: UNDP, 2009.- 229 p.

\*\* The World Bank, <http://data.worldbank.org>

**Table 2. - Total Social Expenditure as share of GDP, in %, 1980-2010**

	1980	1985	1990	1995	2000	2005	2010
Ukraine	-*	-	-	-	-	-	25
Russian Federation	-	-	-	-	-	-	16
Poland	-	-	14.9	22.6	20.5	21.0	21.8
Sweden	27.1	29.4	30.2	32.1	28.5	29.4	28.3
Germany	22.7	23.2	22.3	26.5	26.2	26.7	27.1
The Great Britain	16.7	19.8	17.0	20.2	19.2	21.3	23.7

Sources: OECD (2012)

\* – the national and international statistics do not contain the estimated meanings of the indicator

According to the indicators of quality of life, Ukraine has the worst meanings in a set of the compared countries, with the exception of indicator of life expectancy in comparison with Russia. There is a significant gap in meanings of indicators of life expectation, HDI, GNP per capita

<sup>1</sup> [www.europeansocialsurvey.org](http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org)

between the post-socialist countries, notably Ukraine, and Western European countries selected for analysis. Some positive trends in social-economic development of post-Socialist societies in the first decade of the 2000s (some decrease of the absolute poverty as well as increase of the life expectancy) have not impacted remarkably on total state of life quality in cross-national perspective. More over, in the 2000s a tendency of the aging of societies grew which was attended by increase of emigration of the more educated youth in post-Socialist countries. These structural features spark the rise of social risks for individual wellbeing, which are realized by citizens, that impacts on social demands and mass expectations from the state.

Corresponding to capacity of a state' responsibility, we distinguished three referent models – a 'liberal', a 'social-democratic', and a 'continental'. *We wonder about fitness these models to a society; a level of legitimizing of these models.*

Each of the separated models differs from others by capacity of the state' social responsibility: from shorter capacity in a 'liberal' model up to more penetrating one in a 'social-democracy' model. However, the state penetration into a society and private individual or family life can bring as positive so negative social effects. The positive probable effects are the decrees of social tension in a society, poverty, social inequality. In the same time the negative effects can arise on the ground of the huge social commitments of a state which make a press on economy (cause a slowdown of economic growth), lead to weakness of social ties and solidarity in a society as well as to decrease of individual responsibility for own (and family's) wellbeing.

We will analyze the citizen's attitudes towards the welfare state models in a three-dimension space of: (1) individual and class-based expectations of state's capacity of social protection, or social responsibility of a state; (2) assessment of the utility of welfare state, and (3) estimations of the welfare state's risks for social development. It is assumed that the inclining by citizens to a 'social-democracy' model is characterized with expectations both of strong a state's social assistance, and of a high utility of welfare state in combination with expectation of the low risks sparked by welfare state on society' development. In some contrast to this case, it is supposed that the inclining by citizens to a 'liberal' model appears in mass expectations of a weak state's social assistance (due to the prevailed idea about social responsibility just the citizens for own life and own family's wellbeing), as well as of the weak utility of welfare state aggregating with high welfare state's risks, or its negative influence on social development. Meanwhile, it is admitted that the supporters of a 'continental' model have moderate expectations concerning a welfare state, its utility as well as negative social consequences. Besides, it is supposed, that assessment of the welfare state's utility and estimations of the welfare state's risks can explain strongly the expectations of social responsibility of a state. The generalized expected profiles of commitment to these three basic welfare state models are presented in Table 3.

**Table 3. Generalized expected profiles of commitment to different welfare state models**

Citizens' attitudes	Models of a welfare state		
	Liberal	Continental	Social-democratic
Expectation of social responsibility of a state	-+	+	++
Assessment of the utility of a welfare state	-+	+	++
Risk assessment of a welfare state	++	+	+-

The symbols "+" and "-" designate the theoretically expected relative estimations of the strong attitudes ("++"), and the weak attitudes ("-").

On empirical data about mass attitudes in six European countries, these theoretically expected profiles will be tested, that will allows us also to define empirically a location of each country under scrutiny in the dimensions of three basic models. We assume that the countries with well-developed market capitalism and a long-term history of a welfare state regime will represent the corresponding model of mass disposition measured by social attitudes and expectations. The analysis of profiles of post-socialist countries with institutionally changed welfare state, the reforming of which is still in progress, will allow us to outline the inclination of a society towards

the certain welfare model. The conversion in our analysis from generalized indices (or aggregated data) measured at a country level to a group-level analysis (on a social class, gender, age etc. levels, or on the individual level) will allow to define the factors influencing on incline of citizens towards a certain welfare regime.

### Attitudes of citizens to welfare regime: some findings of empirical analysis

The questionnaire of the ESS-4 (2009 p.) contains a module aimed to measure the mass need in state assistance in the following social issues: health protection, employment security, support of a family and the elderly people (questions D15-D20<sup>2</sup>). The questions and indicators correspond with the main dimensions of a welfare state. For calculation of an additive index on the basis of the indicators mentioned above, it was analyzed the one-factor solution (using the principal component analysis) for each country under scrutiny. The one-factor solution for each country explains from 47 % (for the Great Britain) to 57 % (for Ukraine and Russian Federation) of the general variation. This is the important argument in favor to the validity of the one-dimensional concept ‘social expectation of a *social responsibility of a state*’. The appropriate additive index, calculated as the mean of variables D15-D20, highly correlates with the one-factor solution ( $r > 0.99$  for every country). For the pooled data of six countries one-factor solution explains 55% of the general variation and also highly correlates with appropriate additive index ( $r = 0.996$ ). The reliability coefficient Cronbach’s  $\alpha$ , which characterizes the internal consistency of the additive index, is a rather high in each country and varies from 0.76 (for Great Britain) up to 0.84 (for Ukraine), and has value 0.83 for pooled data. On the basis of this preliminary analysis, it was calculated an index of citizen’s expectation of social responsibility of a state (named *StatResp*) as a mean of the variables D15-D20. The index varies from 0 to 10, where the ‘0’ means the social expectation of non-interference of a state into individual and family’s wellbeing (the minimum social responsibility of a state), and the ‘10’ means the opposite social expectation - of full (maximum) social responsibility of a state. The index’s means are compared for all six countries under study. Means of index manifest essential and, what is important for us, theoretically expected (for the western countries) differences in values, that allow us to consider this index as good measure of key subjective characteristic (‘estimation of social responsibility of governance’) of the empirical welfare state models. So, this index can be used as a *dependent variable* in our further analysis. The means for six countries are presented in Table 4.

**Table 4. Index of social responsibility of governance (*StatResp*, means for six countries)**

	Mean	N	Standard deviation
Ukraine	8.67	1845	1.57
Russian Federation	8.30	2512	1.66
Poland	7.76	1619	1.58
Sweden	7.74	1830	1.29
Great Britain	7.23	2352	1.35
Germany	7.20	2751	1.51

<sup>2</sup> See the following questions in the questionnaire: “People have different views on what the responsibilities of governments should or should not be. How much responsibility governments should have to...?”

**D15** - ...ensure a job for everyone who wants one?

**D16** - ...ensure adequate health care for the sick?

**D17** - ...ensure a reasonable standard of living for the old?

**D18** - ...ensure a reasonable standard of living for the unemployed?

**D19** - ...ensure sufficient child care services for working parents?

**D20** - ...provide paid leave from work for people who temporarily have to care for sick family members?

In compliance with the theoretical expectations, Sweden society, with its ‘social-democratic’ model of welfare state, manifests higher social expectations than British society with its ‘liberal’ model. The differences of means are significant at  $p < 0.05$ . The difference of index means for Germany (the ‘continental’ model) and for the Great Britain is not significant (at  $p = 0.05$ ), that is not consistent with theoretical expectations (see Table 3). Poland, according to this index of social expectation, inclines to the ‘social-democratic’ model (the difference of mean values for Poland and Sweden is not significant at  $p = 0.05$ ). The highest level of social expectations is observed in Ukrainian and Russian data, that can be explain by strong claims on social assistance from a state which were formed under the state socialism. Let us note that the index’s mean in Ukraine is remarkably more salient than in Russia, but even in Russia the index’s mean is higher than in other countries under study. What factors do influence on the social expectations (at the individual level)?

We constructed next two indices, viz. *an index of assessment of the utility of a welfare state* and *an index of social risks sparked by a welfare state*, on the base of questions D21-D29<sup>3</sup> of the survey questionnaire. The two-factor solutions (principal component analysis) for the data of each country have very similar structures and interpretations and explain quite similar amount of variance. The second factor is clearly interpreted as an assessment of the utility of welfare state and the first one is well-interpreted as an estimation of social risks from welfare state to the development of society. For unification of the measurement’s tool and for further cross-national comparison, the final factor analysis was done on pooled six countries data. Two-factor solution has the same clear interpretation and explains 62% of general variation (see Table 5).

**Table 5. Estimation of social risks and utility of a welfare state: two-factor solution for six countries (pooled data, principal component analysis, varimax rotation)**

To what extent do you agree or disagree that social benefits and services in your country...	Factors	
	1	2
D29 ...make people less willing to look after themselves and their family?	<b>0.849</b>	0.054
D27... make people lazy?	<b>0.843</b>	0.052
D28 ...make people less willing to care for one another?	<b>0.843</b>	0.073
D21 ...place too great a strain on the economy?	<b>0.661</b>	0.103
D25 ...cost businesses too much in taxes and charges?	<b>0.630</b>	0.127
D23 ...lead to a more equal society?	0.041	<b>0.821</b>
D22 ...prevent widespread poverty?	0.106	<b>0.797</b>
D26 ...make it easier for people to combine work and family life?	0.117	<b>0.765</b>
<i>Percent of variance</i>	38%	24%

The estimated factors values were linearly transformed that allowed us to form next two indices: index of assessment of the utility of welfare state (*BenfSS*) and index of estimation of social risks from a welfare state (*RiskSS*). Both indices varies from the ‘0’ (minimum assessment of the utility as well as minimum estimation of social risks) up to ‘10’ (maximum estimations correspondently). The means of three indices for the countries under study are presented in Table 6.

**Table 6. Empirical profiles of six countries in three-dimensional space of attitudes to welfare state**

	1. Expectations of social responsibility of a state ( <i>StatResp</i> )	Range 1	2. Estimations of social risks of a welfare state ( <i>RiskSS</i> )	Range 2	3. Assessment of the utility of a welfare state ( <i>BenfSS</i> )	Range 3
<b>Ukraine</b>	8.67	1	4.27	4	4.67	5

<sup>3</sup> Wording of questions D21-D29 is presented in Table 5.

<b>Russian Federation</b>	8.30	2	4.15	5	4.43	6
<b>Poland</b>	7.76	3	5.51	2	4.93	4
<b>Sweden</b>	7.74	3	4.95	3	6.14	1
<b>Germany</b>	7.20	4	5.43	2	5.59	2
<b>Great Britain</b>	7.23	4	6.04	1	5.27	3

According to the data in Table 6, the ratio of mean values of the indices of the utility and social risks of welfare state for Great Britain, Germany and Sweden fully corresponds to the theoretical expectations (see Table 3). In Great Britain (the ‘liberal’ model), compared with other countries under study, they demonstrate highest estimation of social risks (or social fears concerning the negative consequences on social development from a welfare state) as well as the lowest assessment of the utility of public social programs. The Swedish data (the ‘social-democratic’ model), in a contrast, represents the highest assessment of the welfare state’s utility and the lowest estimation of social risks. The consistency of the empirical profiles of the welfare regimes of these three countries is a good argument for validity of defined three-dimension space of social attitudes towards a welfare regime.

The comparison of Western and Eastern European countries gives some rather unexpected findings. So, the highest, in comparison with other countries, level of expectations from welfare state in post-Socialist Ukraine and Russia is combined with the lowest assessment of the welfare state’s utility as well as with the lowest estimation of social risks of it. In total, the assessments and estimations both in Ukraine and Russia do not correspond to any of three basic welfare state models. However, this evidence does only partially confirm the typology of the ‘welfare regimes’ elaborated by Ebbinghaus (2012; see Fig.1) with paying attention to the ‘post-Socialist world’. If institutionally the post-socialist models e.g. in Poland more fits to ‘continental’ regime like in Germany, but the composition of relevant social attitudes and expectations is closer to the ‘social – democratic’ model. As a consequence for the policy reforming, attempts to implement any of the models, which were historically developed and rooted in Western Europe, can not find support from the post-Socialist citizens, and such a social policy, probably, will be ineffective.

#### *What determines social expectations of citizens?*

Thus, why different societies demonstrate so diverse attitudes to a welfare state and to social responsibility of a state for individual and family’s wellbeing? Or, what factors (at individual level of analysis) influence the attitudes?

The index of expectations of social responsibility of governance (StateResp, constructed above) will be used as a dependent variable in the regressive model. It was introduced (see Table 5) two orthogonal (uncorrelated) indices - index of assessment of the utility of welfare state (*BenfSS*) and index of estimation of social risks from a welfare state (*RiskSS*), which both describe well the differences between the empirical welfare state models (represented in social consciousness by citizens), and which both can influence significantly on the social attitudes to a welfare state.

We assume that the expectation by citizens of social responsibility of a state can be explain by a **complex conjectural causation** model, where the depended variable can be a *complex function of institutional, cultural and structural parameters* of citizen’s interaction with a state and a social system. As Shalev (2001) has put it, the argument is that welfare regimes should be seen as a limited number of qualitatively different configurations with distinctive historical roots. The real long-term social policy and politics can affect strongly on citizen’s social attitudes, expectations and assessments concerning a state; on the other side, perception and expectations of social responsibility of a state can be differ for social groups and classes having diverse access to resources unequally distributed in a society. On the basis of these reasoning, in our explanatory model we include the following variables (see Table 7), describing the potential factors which probably determine the citizen’s expectation of social responsibility of the state for individual and family’s wellbeing.

As potential factors we consider, first, complex effects of interaction between individuals with a state, its welfare policy and a social system which are subjectively represented at individual level; these representations reflect an individual experience of interaction with social institutes and can be measure by such variables as: two orthogonal indices of assessment of the utility of welfare state (*BenfSS*) and of estimation of social risks from a welfare state (*RiskSS*); additive index of evaluation of the social system of the country (*SSEval*), and an additive index of trust to public institutions (*Trust*).

The second probable group of factors contains an ideological and cultural dimension of social attitudes towards a welfare regime, presented at individual level. In the analyses we use only one additive variable measuring an attitude to social justice supported by a state (*Equality*).

The third group of factors presents the social structure relevant parameters. We are taking into account in our analysis that there are numerous evidences that the *social cleavages* drive the politics of welfare state reform. As C.de la Porte and K.Jacobsson (2012) note, that different national patterns are embedded in social policy and help to shape distinct national varieties of capitalism with appropriate social structure. If in fact welfare states are deeply integrated into national variants of capitalism, one can expects that employers' attitudes toward welfare state will be complex. This can help to explain why employers have often been more halfhearted and internally divided over policy reform than many theories of political economy might have anticipated (Shalev 2001). The stressing of the connections between social policy arrangements and socio-structural change, or variety of cross-cutting lines of social conflict, emerging from the transition to a post-industrial as well as to a market (for post-Socialist countries) economy allows greater precision in identifying the social legitimizing of welfare state that can generate the greatest discontent among welfare policy and its efficacy. We will test two structural-sensitive models for explanation of social expectations of citizens - one based on involvement into consideration the social class cleavage (between the employers and employees – see the variable *Employer* in Table 7), and the other one with other structural parameters such as gender, age, education, type of residence place and personal social network (see Table 7). One of the questions, that we are interested in, is how influential is social class cleavage in explanation of social responsibility expectations in different welfare models.

**Table 7. Potential factors for explanatory models of citizen's expectation of social responsibility of governance**

**1. Subjective effects of interaction of citizens with welfare regime and social system per se (institutional factors)**

<b>BenfSS</b>	- the index is described above
<b>RiskSS</b>	-the index is described above
<b>SSEval</b>	- evaluation of the social system of a country; single factor solution for D11-D14, six countries pooled data, principal component analysis, 52% of variance. <b>D11.</b> What do you think overall about the standard of living of pensioners? <b>D12.</b> What do you think overall about the standard of living of people who are unemployed <b>D13.</b> What do you think overall about the provision of affordable child care services for working parents? <b>D14.</b> What do you think overall about the opportunities for young people to find a job? <i>(0 means "extremely bad" and 10 means "extremely good")</i>
<b>Trust</b>	- trust to public institutions; index is constructed as mean of B4-B8 and varies from 0 (no trust) to 10 (high level of trust), Cronbach's alpha is about 0.9 How much do you <u>personally</u> trust each of the following institutions... <i>(0 means "do not trust an institution at all" and 10 means "complete trust")</i> <b>B4</b> ...country's parliament? <b>B5</b> ...the legal system? <b>B6</b> ...the police? <b>B7</b> ...politicians? <b>B8</b> ...political parties?

**2. Individual values of equality and social justice**

<b>Equality</b>	- attitude to social justice supported by a state; single factor solution for B30 D1
-----------------	--

D4, six countries pooled data, principal component analysis, 54% of variance

**B30.** The government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels

**D1.** Large differences in people's incomes are acceptable to properly reward differences in talents and efforts.

**D4.** For a society to be fair, differences in people's standard of living should be small  
(1 means "agree strongly" and 5 means "disagree strongly")

### 3. Social structure belonging

- Employer** - class cleavage under capitalism; dichotomous variable that select group of employers ('capitalists', 'small employers' and 'skilled managers' in the class scheme by E.O.Wright) in opposition to the employees.
- EmplType** - type of employability; dichotomous variable that select group of employee (=1) in opposition to those who have own business or is a self-employed person; calculated on F12, dichotomous variable
- Gender** - dichotomous variable that select men (=1)
- ag\_25** - dichotomous variable that select people of 18- 25 years old (=1); the selection of this age group was done on a basis of empirical calculations of significance of different age groups in the linear model
- Educ** - education; the number of years that respondent has spent for full-time education
- City** - dichotomous variable that select residents of cities and suburbs (=1)
- LowInc** - dichotomous variable on F32 that select families with low income (three first deciles of family income in the country = 1)
- Reciprocity** - availability of social support from the people around (as an indicator of a personal social network);  
**F34.** If you were in serious financial difficulties and had to borrow money to make ends meet, how difficult or easy would that be?  
(1 means "very difficult" and 5 means "very easy")

The mean values for six countries of the key institutional and culturally-sensitive parameters selected for the modeling, are presented in Table 8. The data demonstrates significant differences between countries of Western European regimes of welfare states and of post-Socialist states, including Poland, Russian Federation and Ukraine. In particular, in Ukraine and in Russia the high level of expectations of social support (*StatResp*) and a high level of support for income redistribution by the state in order to achieve greater material equality between citizens (*Equality*) are combined both with a low estimate of risk of negative effects of social benefits and services provided by a state to the economy and morality in a society (*RiskSS*) and with a low estimate of the state utility of social support (*BenfSS*) as well as with low estimate of the effectiveness of social system in general (*SSEval*). This inconsistency in Ukraine matches the extreme low level of trust in public institutions (*Trust*).

**Table 8. Means of indices for six countries**

	Great Britain	Germany	Sweden	Poland	Russian Federation	Ukraine
<b>StatResp</b>	7.23	7.20	7.74	7.76	8.30	8.67
<b>RiskSS</b>	6.04	5.43	4.95	5.51	4.15	4.27
<b>BenfSS</b>	5.27	5.59	6.14	4.93	4.43	4.67
<b>SSEval</b>	5.75	5.82	6.13	4.68	3.88	3.55
<b>Trust</b>	4.58	4.86	5.57	3.31	3.57	1.75
<b>Equality</b>	4.52	4.73	5.02	4.98	5.57	5.32

The inconsistency in the attitudes in post-Socialist societies is an evidence of the catastrophic shortage of the state in social sphere that formed during the post-socialist period of the market transition the mass negative experience of interaction between citizens and a state and the social protection system which led to mass discontent of a state and mass alienation from it.

Below there are two regression models which estimate influence of different potential factors (see Table 7) to the level of expectations of social responsibility of governance. The first model includes variable *Employer* that is introduced into the model possible class cleavage between the employers and employees (see Table 9).

**Table 9. - The class-specific model of citizen's expectations of social responsibility of governance in six countries.** Standardized OLS regression for each of the six countries. *StatResp* is a dependent variable

	<b>Great Britain</b>	<b>Germany</b>	<b>Sweden</b>	<b>Poland</b>	<b>Russian Feder.</b>	<b>Ukraine</b>
<b>RiskSS</b>	-0.094*	-0.120*	-0.100*	-0,111*	-0.164*	-0.140*
<b>BenfSS</b>	0.065*	0.042*	0.135*	0.102*	0.078*	0.037
<b>SSEval</b>	-0.134*	-0.131*	-0.041	-0.144*	-0.253*	-0.231*
<b>Equality</b>	0.294*	0.307*	0.320*	0.324*	0.283*	0.115*
<b>Trust</b>	0,066*	0.011	0.034	-0.042	0.071*	-0.094*
<b>Employer</b>	-0.049*	-0.017	-0.002	-0.074*	0.020	-0.101*
<b>R<sup>2</sup></b>	<b>0.14</b>	<b>0.16</b>	<b>0.17</b>	<b>0.21</b>	<b>0.23</b>	<b>0.13</b>

\* - coefficient is significant at the level  $p < 0.05$

According to the *class-specific model* for all six countries, the strongest factor is described by the culturally and ideologically based variable: individual attitudes towards social justice (*Equality*), which corresponds with a redistribution policy of a state. It is interesting, that this factor influences stronger in western European societies with different welfare regimes as well as in Poland than in the post-Soviet countries (especially in Ukraine) which are characterized with uncompleted till now post-Socialist reforms of social policy and institutes as well as with high social risks. This finding is match the general conclusion recently given by Swallfors and Kulin (2012) about that 'the links between values and attitudes are generally stronger in more materially secure and privileged classes [and societies]. However, the relative strength of the associations varies substantially across countries. Where inequality is smaller and poverty less prevalent, the link between values and attitudes becomes less class-specific'.

Negative influence of the assessment of risk of a welfare state (or negative effects of social benefits and services to the economy and morality in a society) – *RiskSS* - is significant in all countries, but the most influence this factor has in the post-Soviet countries. At the same time effect of the trust to public institutions (*Trust*) is much smaller and is significant only in three countries - Ukraine, the Great Britain and Russian Federation. It is interesting, that in Ukraine, in contrast to Great Britain and Russian Federation, the influence of Trust is negative. Concerning the class cleavage (*Employer*), it has a weak effect on expectations of social responsibility of governance only in Ukraine, the Great Britain and Poland: the employees have higher demands to social responsibility of governance than the opposite class of employers. But in Germany and Sweden with stronger social-democratic component in welfare regime the influence of the class cleavage is not significant. In Russian Federation the link between class variable and expectation of social responsibility of governance is not significant, but tends to be positive, that can be interpreted in terms of undeveloped social contract in a society.

Other ('structural') explanatory model also includes institutional and cultural factors and is oriented at a wider set of social structure factors except a social class. The replacing in the model the factor of class cleavage to the set of other social structural factors (age, gender, education, income stratification, type of residence and social network) does not significantly increase explanatory power of the model (see Table 10). The basic structure of the influence of the institutional and cultural factors (which were included also into the first model) remains the same. The model demonstrates an essential national-based specific. In comparison with other structural parameters, only the factor *Education* has stable significant influence on social expectations in most

countries (however, except Ukraine and Sweden): the less educated people have more demands to social responsibility of governance.

Other structural factors were manifested as significant from one up to three countries under scrutiny. So, the factor of belonging to the youth (18-25 years old) is more significant in the explanatory model in Poland, has a weak significance in the Great Britain. In contrast, in Sweden the belonging to elder age groups better (but also weakly) explains the social expectations concerning a welfare state. Theoretically it was expected more significance of belonging to personal social networks (*Reciprocity*) in explanation of social attitudes to welfare state in post-socialist countries with still unstable welfare regime. But as a negative factor, decreasing expectations of social support by state, it is significant only for two western countries - the Great Britain and Germany. It is interesting, that only in the post-Soviet countries (Ukraine and Russia), more social support from a state is expected by people dwelling in less urban territories (*City*). The factor of economic stratification (on income) is manifested its significance only in post-socialist countries in our study. In Russia and in Ukraine the people with low income expect more social support. The *Gender* factor is significant only in Sweden and Poland where female manifest more orientation on social support from governance.

Thus, the models are found as more influential for post-socialist Poland and Russia than for all other countries, and the influence of the structural model is a little better than the class-specific one for all countries under scrutiny.

**Table 10. The structural-specific model of citizen's expectations of social responsibility of governance in six countries (without a class variable).** Standardized OLS regression for each of the six countries. *StatResp* is dependent variable.

	Great Britain	Germany	Sweden	Poland	Russian Feder.	Ukraine
<b>RiskSS</b>	-,108*	-,142*	-,103*	-,107*	-,167*	-,164*
<b>BenfSS</b>	,079*	,052*	,140*	,099*	,062*	,000
<b>SSEval</b>	-,114*	-,094*	-,028	-,172*	-,213*	-,197*
<b>Equality</b>	,269*	,271*	,287*	,274*	,256*	,140*
<b>Trust</b>	,056*	,015	,030	-,037	,111*	-,121*
<b>Reciprocity</b>	-,059*	-,106*	-,037	,000	,006	,034
<b>EmplType</b>	,060*	,023	,006	,023	,006	,038
<b>Gender</b>	-,018	-,038	-,108*	-,080*	,039	-,052
<b>ag_25</b>	,050*	,000	-,059*	,112*	-,001	,004
<b>Educ</b>	-,078*	-,076*	-,035	-,176*	-,067*	,072
<b>City</b>	,010	-,018	-,041	,007	-,095*	-,082*
<b>LowInc</b>	,041	,035	-,003	-,065*	,069*	,108*
<b>R<sup>2</sup></b>	<b>0.16</b>	<b>0.19</b>	<b>0.18</b>	<b>0.25</b>	<b>0.22</b>	<b>0.16</b>

### Conclusion and points for discussion

The empirical analyses of the three-dimensional space of social attitudes to a welfare state as well as the causation model explaining the influences on social attitudes of a complex of factors led us to the following conclusions.

First, the citizen's attitudes to social responsibility of governance for individual and family's wellbeing manifest themselves well in the three-dimension space of social expectations, assessments, and estimations. The 'three welfare regimes' theoretical model well describes differences in attitudes between the western European states like the Great Britain, Germany and Sweden; the corresponding tools (indicators and questions) used in ESS Round 4 is enough sensitive to measurement of the empirical differences of this models.

Second, the citizen's attitudes diverge essentially in a comparative line between countries and they are connected notably with a system state of a society. The state is defined within two different types: (1) welfare regime embedded historically into capitalism, market and civil society, and (2) a still forming welfare system under post-socialist transformation. The empirical analyses of social attitudes profiles in the Great Britain and Sweden demonstrate correspondence of these profiles to theoretical models of a 'liberal' and 'social democratic' welfare regimes, accordingly. However, the social attitude profile of Germany is some shifted from the expected 'continental' model toward more liberal one. It means more liberal attitudes and stronger individual responsibility for personal and family's wellbeing. One can assume that this empirical shift is the aftermath of the essential changes in social policy and welfare regime in Germany in the 2000s (Häusermann 2010; Butterwegge 2012).

As it was expected theoretically, the empirical profiles of the post-Socialist countries on the attitudes towards a welfare state are inconsistent. In this comparative post-socialist line, only Polish society manifests a certain correlation between indicators of social attitudes and assessments, and also their inclining towards a 'social-democratic' model of welfare regime. This conclusion does not agree with location of Poland in a 'map' of welfare regimes on their institutional parameters proposed by Ebbinghaus (2012). One can assume that this inclining is a result of a legacy of state socialism as well as of a softer system transformation regime in Poland during the 1990s which was accomplished by a better adapted social policy that allowed people to conform better to new market institutions.

Удалено: policy, that

The social consciousness in post-Soviet Russian and Ukrainian societies remain more depended on the paternalistic values and attitudes which were dominated in the late Soviet society. The paternalistic attitudes are manifested themselves on a background of undeveloped values of individual responsibility and civil activity as well as of inability of the societies to foresee the negative consequences of welfare state on economic development as well as on moral and social cohesion of society. Social consciousness of the Ukrainians is rather paradoxical: the very high social expectations of welfare state are combined with the lowest (in comparative perspective of the study) assessments of the utility of the social policy as well as the lowest trust to the state, governance and other public institutes. The manifested social attitudes in post-Soviet Ukraine and Russia do not match any basic European welfare state models. Thus, any of the represented models can not be rooted in culture and social structure via social political reforms during a visible future.

Thirdly, using the linear regression analysis it was justified an empirical model of institutional, cultural, and structural determinants of social attitudes to a welfare regime. One can assert that the social attitudes and expectations of citizens depend essentially on individual experience of interaction between an individual and policy institutes as well as a social system as whole. The higher individual estimations of the current system of social security and protection, the systems of education, health care, social support in a state of unemployment are, the lower expectation of social support from governance is. On the other side, the higher risk evaluation of social policy is, the lower expectations of social responsibility of governance are.

The assumption that the level of family income is the most influential factor determining the attitudes to social responsibility of governance is not justified. The belonging of individuals to the first three (lowest) deciles of income (*LowInc*) has a positive effect on the social expectations only in post-Soviet countries like Ukraine and Russia; but in Ukraine this effect is more salient.

Stratification on education (*Educ*) is appeared as more or less significant factor influencing on social expectations. Some difference concerns Ukraine where there is no effect of education on the social attitudes to welfare state. One can suppose that all educational groups in this country experience the similar social risks and need equally social support from a state.

The very high social expectations concerning a welfare state in combination with very low level of trust to public institutes as well as low assessment of the utility of a welfare state are paradoxical characteristics of post-Soviet countries under study. Especially in Ukraine this paradox is most salient and indicates a catastrophic insufficiency of social responsibility of governance. During the twenty years of post-Soviet development this insufficiency of governance has not been compensated by social policy or by the activity of some other possible subjects of social responsibility (e.g. civil society or local community). Under conditions of the social, economic and

moral crises in a society, under conditions the rapid changes in social structure and values system, this insufficiency of the state leads increasing of social alienation and produces as the result deep cleavage of interests between the governance and governing elites, on the one side, and a society as a whole, on the opposite side.

One of unexpected result of our analysis is that class belonging (employer vs. employee, that reflect industrial social cleavage) has rather low or even not significant influence on social attitudes to a welfare state. One can assume that this finding reflects the reality of the modern capitalism in which the capitalists, employers, and managers adjust the welfare state, and the welfare state adjusts them. Over time, national welfare states become an important part of the institutional matrix shaping practices at the level of the firm and influencing broader efforts at national economic management. If in fact welfare states are deeply integrated into national variants of capitalism, it is true to expect that employers' attitudes toward welfare state will be more complex. This helps to explain why employers have often been more half-hearted and internally divided over welfare state than many theories of political economy might have anticipated.

The popular thesis about social cleavages, which probably have to determine the social attitudes, is not justified in our study. In the Great Britain with its liberal welfare regime and long-term class-oriented social policy, the structural factors empirically manifested themselves weakly. Even in Sweden, where large-scale public sectors might be expected to generate such structural effects, we are forced to acknowledge that the empirical support of the thesis is more than modest. In effort to determine if these hypothesized cleavages over the welfare state are actually evident in public opinion, Svallfors concludes, that public- vs. private-sector employment does not seem to constitute a particularly important fault line (1997: 292; 2003). Our analysis also confirms that the differences in social attitudes are seldom statistically significant, they point in different directions on different indices, sometimes showing, for instance, the public-sector employees to be more in favour of redistribution and small income differences than the private-sector employees, sometimes the opposite.

In conclusion, let us note that our empirical analysis fixes a very unsteady current process of welfare development and of searching for fitter forms of social contracts in different types of European societies. The post-Socialist states form a special 'worlds' in the wide European space, in which the post-Soviet states are a quite distinct family (Castels & Obinger 2008: 321) of social systems which try to construct own forms of social order. Development of better models of social responsibility on a balance between governance, market (family) and civil society, on broad cross-class coalitions in support of major reform packages (Häusermann 2010), adjustment of the model to social expectations in a country is the challenge for as the Western so Eastern European societies. However this development can not be effective without the humanization of societies, strengthening trust in governance and public institutes, strengthening of social responsibility of public servants, and without accumulation of positive experience of interaction between citizens and a state.

#### **References:**

- Abrahamson, Peter (2010) European Welfare States Beyond Neoliberalism: Toward the Social Investment State. *European. In: Development and Society*, Volume 39, Number 1, June: 61-95.
- Alexander, Jeffrey C. (2000) Theorizing the Good Society: Hermeneutic, Normative and Empirical Discourses. In: *The Canadian Journal of Sociology*, Vol.25, No.3, Summer 2000. Pp. 271-309.
- Alexander, Jeffrey C. (2006) *The Civil Sphere*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Bable, Thomas, Jurgen Kohl, and Claus Wendt (2010) Welfare State. In: Immerfall, Stefan and Goran Therborn (eds.) *Handbook on European Societies. Social Transformations in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*. Springer.
- Butterwegge Chr. *Krise und Zukunft des Sozialstaates*. Wiesbaden: VS-Verlag 4., überarbeitete und erweiterte Auflage 2012.
- Castels, Francis G. (2008) What Welfare States Do: A Disaggregated Expenditure Approach. In: *Journal of Social Policy*. Cambridge University Press, 38, 1: pp.45-62.
- Castles, Francis G., and Herbert Obinger (2008) Worlds, Families, Regimes: Country Clusters in European and OECD Area Public Policy. In: *West European Politics?* 31(2): pp. 321-344.
- Clegg, Daniel (2007) Continental Drift: on Unemployment Policy Change in Bismarckian Welfare States. In: *Social Policy and Administration*, 41(6): pp. 597-617.

- Collins, R. (2010) Technological Displacement and Capitalist Crisis: Escapes and Dead Ends / Sociological Review Hundredth Anniversary Conference, Stratford-on-Avon, England, 2009. In: *Political Conceptology*, No. 1, pp. 23-34.
- Cornwall, A. and J. Gaventa (2001). Bridging the gap: citizenship, participation and accountability. PLA Notes 40, February 2001. The World Bank.
- Cornwall, A., and Gaventa, J. (2000). From users and choosers to makers and shapers: repositioning participation in social policy. *IDS Bulletin* 31 (4): pp 50-62.
- De la Porte, C. and Jacobsson, K. (2012) Social investment or re-commodification? Assessing the employment policies of the EU member states. In: Morel, N. Palier, B. and Palme, J. (eds.) *Towards a Social Investment Welfare State? Ideas, policies and challenges*. Policy Press, Bristol. Pp. 117 – 152.
- Drahoukoupil, Jan (2007) Analysing the Capitalist State in Post-socialism: Towards the Porterian Workfare Postnational Regime. In: *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 31(2): pp. 401-424.
- Ebbinghaus B.(2012) Comparing Welfare State Regime: Are Typologies an Ideal or realistic Strategy? Paper presented at ESPAN, Edinburg, UK.
- Elkin, Stephen L. and Karol Soltan (ed.) (1999) *Citizen Competence and Democratic Institutions*. Series Name: Committee on the Political Economy of the Good Society.
- Ellison, N. (1997) Beyond Universalism and Particularism: Rethinking contemporary welfare theory. In: *Critical Social Policy*, 19 (1): pp. 57-83.
- Esping-Andersen G. (Ed.) (1996) *Welfare States in Transition. National Adaptations in Global Economies*. SAGE Publications.
- Esping-Andersen, G. (2002), *Towards the Good Society, Once Again?* In: G. Esping-Andersen (ed.) *Why We Need a New Welfare State*. Oxford University Press.
- Esping-Anderson G. (1990) *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*. Princeton University Press, New Jersey.
- Etzioni, A. (1996) *The New Golden Rule: Community and Morality in a Democratic Society*. Published by Basic Books.
- Häusermann, Silja (2010) *The Politics of Welfare State Reform in Continental Europe. Modernization in Hard Times* \ Series: Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics. *Universität Zürich*.
- Inglor, T. (2008) *Welfare State in East Central Europe, 1919-2004*. Cambridge. MA: Cambridge University Press.
- Kaufmann F.X. (2010) Black swans and elephants on the move: the impact of emergencies on the welfare state. In: *Journal of European Social Policy*, May 2010: 91-101.
- Kookueva, V.V. and Kegdeeva E.M. (2012) Evaluation of Content and Structure of Expenditure on Social Policy in the Federal Budget. In: *Molodoj Uchenij*, No.8: pp. 109-112. [Кюкюева В. В., Е. М. Кегдеева *Оценка состава и структуры расходов федерального бюджета на социальную политику // Молодой ученый. — 2012. — №8. — С. 109-112*]
- McBarnet, Doreen J., Aurora Voiculescu, and Tom Campbell (2007). *The New Corporate Accountability: Corporate Social Responsibility and the Law*. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
- OESD e-library (2012) Social Issues [http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/social-issues-migration-health/government-social-spending\\_20743904-table1](http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/social-issues-migration-health/government-social-spending_20743904-table1)
- Pierson, P. (2001) *The New Politics of the Welfare State*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Pontusson, Jonas and Richard Clayton (1998) Welfare-State Retrenchment Revisited: Entitlement Cuts, Public Sector Restructuring, and Inegalitarian Trends in Advanced Capitalist Societies. In: *World Politics*, Vol. 51, Number 1, October 1998. Pp. 67-98.
- Popova, I.M. (1998) Social Policy and Paradoxes of Everyday Life's Consciousness. In *Social Policy in Ukraine and the Current Strategy of Adaptation by the Population*. Kyiv: Institute of Sociology at National Academy of science of Ukraine. [Попова І.М. Соціальна політика і парадокси буденної свідомості // Соціальна політика в Україні та сучасні стратегії адаптації населення: Зб.н.ст. – Київ, 1998. С. 145-148]
- Portes, A. (1987) What's an ethnic enclave? The case for conceptual clarity. In: *American Sociological Review*, 52: 768-70.
- Portes, Alejandro, and Saskia Sassen. 1987. "Making It Underground: Comparative Materials on the Informal Sector in Western Market Economies." *American Journal of Sociology*. 93:30-61.
- Reuben, William (2003). The Role of Civic Engagement and Social Accountability in the Governance Equation. In: *Social Development Notes*. Note No. 75 March 2003. The World Bank.
- Sen, Amartya (1999), *Development as Freedom*, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
- Sen, Amartya (2009) *The Idea of Justice* Harvard University Press & London: Allen Lane.

- Shalev, M. (2001) Conclusions: The Politics of Elective Affinity. In: Ebbinghaus, B. and P. Manow (eds.) *Comparing Welfare Capitalism: Social Policy and Political Economy in Europe, Japan and the USA*. London: Routledge. Pp. 287-303.
- Soltan, Karol, and Stephen L. Elkin (ed.) (1996) *The Constitution of Good Societies \ Series Name: Committee on the Political Economy of the Good Society*.
- Svallfors S. (2003) *Welfare Regimes and Welfare Opinions: a Comparison of Eight Western Countries*. \ Social Indicators Research, Vol.64. P.495-520.
- Svallfors S. (2005) *Welfare Attitudes in a Changing Europe \ Proposal title of module \ ESS-4, 2005*.
- Svallfors, Stefan, Joakim Kulin, and Annette Schnabel (2012) *Age, Class, and Attitudes Towards Government Responsibilities*. In: Svallfors, Stefan (ed.) *Contested Welfare States? : Welfare Attitudes in Europe and Beyond*. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Pp. 158-192.
- Svallfors, S. (1997) *Worlds of Welfare and Attitudes to Redistribution: A Comparison of Eight Western Nations*. In: *European Sociological Review*, 13: 283-304.
- The World Bank Report (2011). *Community Driven Development. Putting People First!* - <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTSOCIALDEVELOPMENT/EXTCDD/0,,menuPK:430167~pagePK:149018~piPK:149093~theSitePK:430161,00.html>
- The World Bank Report (2013). *Participation and Civic Engagement*. – <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTSOCIALDEVELOPMENT/EXTPCENG/0,,contentMDK:20509424~menuPK:1278120~pagePK:148956~piPK:216618~theSitePK:410306,00.html>